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LIBERTARIAN CHOICE 
Stewart Goetz 
In this paper, I develop a noncausal view of agency. I defend the thesis that 
choices are uncaused mental actions and maintain, contrary to causal theo-
rists of action, that choices differ intrinsically or inherently from nonactions. 
I explain how they do by placing them in an ontology favored by causal 
agency theorists (agent-causationists). This ontology is one of powers and 
liabilities. 
After explicating how a choice is an uncaused event, T explain how an 
adequate account of freedom involves the concept of choosing for a reason. 
Choosing for a reason is a teleological notion, and I set forth what is 
involved in making a choice for a purpose. 
Libertarianism or agency theory is a central thesis in many positions in 
the philosophy of religion. For example, in philosophizing about the 
problem of evil, many theists advocate the thesis that human free will 
(choice) is an essential component of any defense or theodicy. Though I 
am sympathetic with the position of these theists, the role of free will 
vis-a-vis the problem of evil is not my concern in this paper. Rather, the 
issue of choice per se is what concerns me. Theists who address the issue 
of freedom and incorporate it in their theistic philosophy have routinely 
thought of libertarianism in terms of agent-causation. Thus, in his 
advice to Christian philosophers, Alvin Plantinga maintains that U[w]hat 
is really at stake in [the discussion of libertarianism versus determinism] 
is the notion of agent causation".1 Similarly, in his discussion of duty 
and divine goodness, Thomas Morris says that I/[a] great many theists 
favor a libertarian (agent-causation) analysis of free action."2 Finally, in 
her discussion of Hell, Marilyn Adams asserts that a realistic picture of 
human agency includes the idea that "[wle adults with impaired free-
dom are responsible for our choices ... in the sense that we are the agent 
causes of them."3 
Contrary to what these Christian philosphers suggest, agent-causa-
tion is not required for constructing an adequate libertarian account of 
freedom. Elsewhere, I have argued that agent-causation is actually 
superfluous for this purpose/ and in this paper I develop a non-causal 
account of libertarianism in which a choice is essentially an uncaused 
mental action done for a reason, purpose, or telos.s Libertarians have 
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argued in the past/ and continue to argue,' that a libertarianism in 
which a free action is an uncaused teleological event is ultimately inde-
fensible. In opposition to these causal agency theorists, I defend a liber-
tarian view in which it is a conceptual truth that a choice is essentially an 
uncaused purposeful mental action.S 
In Section I, it is argued that understanding a choice as an uncaused 
mental action satisfies a desideratum of any libertarian theory, namely, 
that it be able to explain how mental actions differ from mental nonac-
tions or mere happenings. This noncausalist view of choice is developed 
in an ontology where a mental power is an ultimate and irreducible 
property of an agent. To perform a mental act is to exercise a mental 
power. To choose is to exercise the mental power to choose. 
Section II consists of a discussion of how an uncaused choice relates to 
the issue of being free to choose otherwise. While the lack of causation is 
necessary for the freedom to choose otherwise, it is not sufficient. In 
addition to the lack of causation, an adequate account of freedom must 
involve the concept of choosing for a reason. Explanation of a choice by a 
reason is teleological or purposeful explanation and the nature of pur-
poseful explanation is examined and defended in Section II. 
lt is important to emphasize that the purpose of this paper is not to 
argue against proponents of non-libertarian views of choice such as 
compatibilism. Rather, the goal is to construct a positive and coherent 
libertarian account of freedom. One reason often given for rejecting lib-
ertarianism is that it is not an internally consistent view. Because of this, 
it is all the more important for a libertarian to articulate a coherent 
account of freedom. 
I 
A desideratum which any libertarian or agency theory must satisfy is 
that of being able to explain how it is that mental actions such as choices 
differ from mental nonactions or mere happenings.9 Like their nona-
gency opponents, many agent-causationists give a causal explanation: 
mental actions differ from mental nonactions in terms of their causal 
ancestry. They are not intrinsically different. However, while it is true 
that a choice occurs in the context of and is dependent upon the occur-
rence of antecedent events (e.g., the coming to have reasons to act and 
thinking about means to an end), it is plausible to think that a choice 
does not derive its active character from these other events. 
How can a choice be intrinsically active? In the following way: (i) a 
choice is the exercising by an agent of his mental power to choose, where 
(ij) the exercising of a mental power is essentially an uncaused event. 
Consider 0). A mental power is an onto logically irreducible property 
which is exhibited by an entity.lO Corresponding to a mental power is 
the exercising of that power. Exercising a mental power is acting. One 
kind of mental power an agent has is the mental power to choose. When 
an agent exercises it, he chooses. Another mental power an agent has is 
the mental power to reason or think about propositions and their logical 
relations. When an agent exercises this power, he actively directs his 
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attention to propositions and seeks to become aware of their implica-
tions in logical space. 
Carl Ginet has recently defended an account of mental action which 
maintains that any mental act differs intrinsically from passive mental 
events. According to him, a mental act's intrinsic active nature consists 
in its having an 'actish phenomenal quality'. This actish phenomenal 
quality lacks the complex structure of a causal relation and, by itself, is 
enough to make a choice an action. l1 However, it is unwise to character-
ize the intrinsic active nature of a mental act as a phenomenal quality. 
Such a characterization suggests that a mental act has a certain quale or 
feel about it which makes it intrinsically active and distinguishes it from 
a passive mental event. This is a mistake. The exercising of the power 
to choose, like any mental act, has no intrinsic feel to it. Thus, while I 
may feel tired after exercising my power to think, which I do when I 
think at length about free will, this active thinking itself has no intrinsic 
quale any more than choosing does. The active nature of a mental event 
consists solely in the exercising of a mental power.12 
If a mental action is an event which is the exercising of a power, what 
is a mental nonaction or mere happening? It is what I will call the actual-
ization of a mental liability. Like a mental power, a mental liability is an 
ontologically irreducible property which is exhibited by a subject. When 
a subject's mental liability is actualized, he is a patient. Something is 
being done to him. One mental liability a subject has is the liability to 
believe. When his liability to believe is actualized, he believes a proposi-
tion and he is a patient with respect to believing that propositionY 
In summary, there are two types of mental properties, namely, pow-
ers and liabilities. These two kinds of properties are inherently different 
from each other and each is an ultimate category in our ontology. 
Corresponding to these two kinds of mental properties are two kinds of 
events, namely, the exercising of a mental power and the actualization of 
a mental liability. Like the properties themselves, these two kinds of 
events are inherently different from each other such that any token or 
instance of the kind 'being the exercising of a mental power' is intrinsi-
cally distinguished from any token or instance of the kind 'being the 
actualization of a mental liability' . 
Support for (ii) is conceptual in nature. An event which is efficiently 
caused is produced by that cause and as such is an occurrence with 
respect to which its subject is essentially passive. 14 An event is being 
made to occur to the subject and it is not active with respect to that 
event. Since an exercise of mental power is active in nature, it is not pro-
duced and, thus, cannot be caused. 
The intrinsically active and uncaused nature of choosing is confirmed 
by the epistemology of action. In commenting on causal theories of 
action, Harry Frankfurt makes the following point about an agent's 
knowledge of his action: 
They [causal theories] are therefore committed to supposing that 
a person who knows he is in the midst of performing an action 
cannot have derived this knowledge from any awareness of 
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what is currently happening but that he must have derived it 
instead from his understanding of how what is happening was 
caused to happen by certain earlier conditions .... This is what 
makes causal theories implausible. They direct attention exclu-
sively away from the events whose natures are at issue, and 
away from the times at which they occur.1S 
Frankfurt's remarks suggest the following point about mental action 
such as choice. It is an epistemological feature of an agent who knows 
that he is making a choice that he knows this while he is choosing. Given 
this fact, it is natural to think that he knows that he is choosing by being 
aware of the choice which he is making. However, if he knows in this 
way that he is choosing, it seems to follow that choosing is intrinsically 
different from a mere happening or passive event and that he is aware of 
this difference. On a causal theory of action, however, an agent who 
knows that he is choosing cannot possess this knowledge in virtue of his 
awareness of the choice itself. This is because on a causal theory of 
action a choice is not intrinsically different from a mere happening. In 
themselves, the two are indistinguishable. Therefore, an agent can know 
that he is choosing only by being aware of causal differences which dis-
tinguish the two events. 
According to Frankfurt, a causal account of action implies that the 
agent's attention must be directed away from the mental action which 
he is performing in order for him to know that he is acting. Thus, a 
causal theory is unable to account for a significant epistemological fea-
ture of mental action. However, while Frankfurt has directed our atten-
tion to an important epistemological feature of mental action, he unnec-
essarily obscures his point by suggesting that the problem with a causal 
theory of action stems from what it implies about the temporal distance 
separating a mental action from its cause. Thus, Frankfurt not only 
maintains that a causal theory entails that an agent who knows that he is 
choosing must derive his knowledge from an awareness of what causes 
his choice, but also he maintains that the cause is a certain earlier event. 
Because it is, the agent, who knows that he is choosing must be directing 
his attention away from the time at which he is choosing. 
If the problem with a causal theory of action pointed out by Frankfurt 
were essentially linked with this temporal issue, the causal theorist 
would have a rather obvious response. He could merely stipulate that 
the cause which distinguishes his choice from a passive event happens 
simultaneously with the choice.1" Because the cause occurs simultaneous-
ly with the choice, there is no epistemological problem of the kind noted 
by Frankfurt. It is true that the agent who knows that he is choosing 
must look to a causal antecedent, but the causal antecedent is, in virtue of 
its simultaneity with its effect, known immediately by the agent. 
The epistemological problem with a causal theory of action pointed 
out by Frankfurt is not essentially linked with temporal considerations. 
Rather, it arises in light of the fact that agents who know that they are 
performing mental actions possess this knowledge by being aware of the 
. actions themselves, without reference to any cause of them. In the case 
LIBERTARIAN CHOICE 199 
of a choice, the exercising of the power to choose by the agent is essen-
tially uncaused and intrinsically active and the agent knows that he is 
choosing by being aware of the choice itself. 
Recently, William Rowe has suggested that the exercising of a power 
be regarded as an intrinsically uncaused active event. For example, in 
elaborating on Thomas Reid's theory of agency Rowe says that I/[n]ot all 
events have efficient causes. In particular, any event that consists in an 
exertion of active power will lack an efficient cause."17 Nevertheless, 
Rowe does not develop an account of choice which accords with the one 
being developed here. Thus, he claims that an agent makes choices or 
acts of will but these are caused by his uncaused exertion of his active 
power to cause his act of will. 1s On the view of choice which is being 
developed in this paper, an agent does not cause his acts of will (choic-
es). Choosing is the exercise of the power to choose and the exercise of 
this power is essentially uncaused and intrinsically active. There are 
two considerations which recommend this view over Rowe's. 
First, while I am aware of choosing (exercising my power to choose), I 
am never aware of exercising my active power to cause my choice.19 
Second, if one is convinced of the reality of mental powers and their 
exercisings as uncaused events, what is to be gained in a libertarian 
account by positing a power to cause acts of will? Why not just say that 
acts of will are exercisings of the power to choose and, because they are, 
they are essentially uncaused?20 This view is simpler and exemplifies all 
of the virtues of the competing accounU1 
II 
In addition to providing an explanation of how a choice is active and 
not passive in nature, there is another reason for defending the view that 
an act of choice is an essentially uncaused and intrinsically active exer-
cising of the power to choose. This additional reason is that the occur-
rence of such an event helps to account adequately for the freedom to do 
otherwise which has seemed to agency theorists to be a necessary condi-
tion of moral responsibility. If an agent's choice is not caused (or deter-
mined in any other way), it is the case that a necessary condition is ful-
filled for being free to choose otherwise. However, it must not be 
thought that an exercising of the power to choose is fortuitous or ran-
dom because it lacks a cause. When an agent chooses, he has a reason 
which explains that choice and a reason which would explain not mak-
ing that choice or making another choice. This reason-giving structure 
provides the context for choosing and choosing for a reason means that 
a choice does not occur chaotically or randomly. 
To illustrate how an uncaused choice can be made in a nonrandom 
but responsible way, consider the following example. An agent P is con-
sidering whether or not to begin a relationship with a handsome and 
successful colleague at the office. P desires that she begin this relation-
ship. Moreover, P has been having marital difficulties with her hus-
band. He is out of work, depressed, etc. P strongly desires that she go 
home with her colleague one night (call this act 'C) but believes that 
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performing such an act is morally wrong. She believes not only that it is 
right for her not to do C but also that it is right for her to do B, which is 
continuing to support her husband emotionally, sexually, financially, 
etc., through his difficult time. Thus, P has a reason for doing C (to satis-
fy her desire to begin a relationship with her colleague at work) and a 
different reason for doing B (to fulfill her marital commitment to her 
husband). We can say that P's reasons constitute a set of background 
psychological conditions for either choosing to do C or choosing to do B. 
These reasons are neither sufficient for the occurrence or nonoccurrence 
of choosing to do C nor for the occurrence or nonoccurrence of choosing 
to do B. P will be free and responsible for either choice. Given this situ-
ation, the making of either choice will cohere with or will be nonrandom 
in the light of the existing psychological conditions of P. The reasons P 
has for doing either C or B underdetermine both choices, yet the making 
of either would not be random. 
In light of the above considerations, there is a distinction between a 
choice's being random and there being no cause of (or determining con-
dition for) its occurrence. A choice with respect to which an agent is free 
and responsible has no cause of its occurrence. However, since it is 
made for one of the reasons constituting his psychological make-up, it 
will cohere with or be orderly in the context of those reasons. The choice 
which is made because of a reason is not caused by the latter, and the 
agent can either make or refrain from making that choice. If the critic 
insists that a choice performed under the conditions just described is 
nevertheless random because there is no causal, deterministic, lawlike or 
necessitarian explanation of its performance, then his concept of a ran-
dom choice is equivalent to the concept of a choice which is uncaused, 
nondeterministic, nonlawlike or nonnecessitated. The advocate of a 
noncausal theory of choice can plead guilty to the charge that his view 
involves the making of random choices of this kind. 
Galen Strawson recognizes that a libertarian "is likely to locate our 
freedom in our possession of a power to choose."22 However, he argues 
that the concept of a choice which is made for a reason cannot be part of 
an adequate account of freedom. Two arguments which are similar in 
nature are given by Strawson in support of his position. First, he asserts 
that the claim to explain freedom in terms of a choice made for a reason 
fails because such a concept entails an impossible regress of choices. 
Such a regress is allegedly entailed because in order for an agent to be 
responsible for his choice, he must be responsible for having the reason 
for which he made the choice. But, in order to be responsible for having 
that reason, he must have chosen to have it. And, in order to have cho-
sen to have it, he must have had a reason for choosing to have it, ad 
infinitum. Straws on concludes that libertarian freedom which involves a 
choice made for a reason is impossible. 
In response, the libertarian denies that an agent, in order to be free 
with respect to his choice, must be free to choose to have the reason for 
which he makes the choice. An agent cannot just choose to have a cer-
tain reason for acting in a specific way. This is because an agent's rea-
son-giving structure is not something over which he has any direct con-
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trol. While it is true that an agent, in virtue of making certain choices, 
can determine some of the reasons he will have in the future for per-
forming certain kinds of actions, this is only an indirect control over his 
reason-giving structure.23 At some initial point, the reasons which an 
agent had for making a choice will not be a matter over which he has 
any kind of control. An agent must start with some reasons for making 
choices, where those reasons were not themselves chosen. To maintain 
otherwise would require that an agent, at some initial point, choose ex 
nihilo (for no reason at all) to have reasons for acting. Given the plausi-
ble principle (call it the 'principle of universal explanation') that every 
event has an explanation, this is impossible. 
Strawson's second argument against the view that an agent's freedom 
resides in a choice made for a reason claims that a choice made for a rea-
son is rational and non-random (in the sense that it is adequately 
explained by that reason) only if the agent makes that choice in light of 
some further principle or reason which recommends that he choose for 
that reason. 
[I]f it [the agent] has no such ... principles of choice governing 
what decisions it makes in light of its initial reasons for action, 
then the decisions it makes are rationally speaking random: they 
are made by an agent-self that is, in its role as decision-maker, 
entirely non-rational in the present vital sense of 'rational': it is 
reasonless, lacking any principles of choice or decision.24 
In Strawson's second argument/5 the claim is not that the agent who 
chooses to perform act A for a reason R must have chosen to have R, but 
that he must have a principle P for choosing to perform A for R. 
Otherwise, the choice to perform A for R will be random. At this point, 
it is important to distinguish two senses of randomness. The first sense 
is that of being non-rational or being made for no reason at all. The sec-
ond is that of being neither rational (made for a good reason) nor irra-
tional (made for a bad reason). Consider, again, the woman who is 
thinking about becoming involved with her colleague at the office. 
Suppose that she chooses to remain faithful to her husband, B, in order 
to fulfill her marital commitment to him (in order to act morally, as 
opposed to immorally), R. Strawson's claim seems to be that unless 
some P exists in light of which choosing to do B for R is justified or 
unjustified, good or bad (let P be "One ought always to act morally, for 
good reasons, and not immorally, for bad reasons"), then the woman's 
choosing to do B for R is random or reasonless in the sense of being nei-
ther rational nor irrational, even though it is not non-rational. 
If we assume, as seems plausible, that P exists, then Strawson pro-
ceeds to raise the following objection: 
The actions are now once again performed for, and are truly 
explicable just by reference to, [principles]. But, by the same 
token, the original objection regarding the fact that the agent 
cannot be self-determined with respect to these [principles] 
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applies once again with full force. 26 
In other words, Strawson seems to believe that if P is not chosen by 
the agent for some reason, then ultimately the agent cannot be free and 
responsible for his choice to do A for R. But for the agent to choose P, he 
would have to have an additional principle P', in virtue of which he 
chooses P, ad infinitum. 
This argument is a reformulation of the first objection, and the answer 
to the latter is applicable here. There is no more reason to think that an 
agent has control over and is able to choose P, than there is reason to 
think that he has control over and is able to choose R. Moreover, there is 
no reason to think that he must have this kind of control and choice in 
order to be able to choose freely and responsibly to do A for R. 
Choices are essentially uncaused mental actions done for reasons. 
How, it might be asked, can reasons explain choices if they do not cause 
them? The answer to this question is that reasons are teleological expla-
nations of choices. Choosing for a reason is choosing for a purpose. 
Teleological explanation is not a form of causal explanation but a dis-
tinct and irreducible form of explanation. In general, teleological expla-
nation involves an agent (i) conceiving of the future as including a state 
of affairs which is an end to be produced, where this end is provided in 
the propositional content of a belief or a desire,27 (iO conceiving of the 
means to its realization, where the means begin with his performing an 
action (unless the action itself is the end, in which case there will be no 
means), and (iii) performing that action in order to bring about the end. 
In trying to account for freedom, agent-causationists try to explain 
every event in terms of causation on the the grounds that everyone 
believes in the principle of universal causality-everyone believes that 
every event must have a cause.28 Otherwise, they argue, at least some 
events would occur randomly and inexplicably. Nevertheless, agent-
causationists also claim that there are two kinds of explanation, teleolog-
ical and causal, neither of which is reducible to the other.29 
Agent-causationists are confused on the issue of explanation. It is 
plausible to maintain that every event has an explanation (earlier I 
termed this the 'principle of universal explanation') but implausible to 
think that every event has a cause. Moreover, there are two kinds of 
explanation, teleological and causal, neither of which is reducible to the 
other. Sometimes one event will have both kinds of explanation (e.g., an 
agent might cause an event to occur for a reason so that the effect event 
is explained both causally and teleologically). However, choices, 
because they are not effect events (they are uncaused), have only one 
kind of explanation, namely, a teleological explanation-an explanation 
in terms of a reason. Because a choice is an uncaused mental action it 
has only a teleological explanation. 
A frequent criticism of teleological explanation says that teleological 
explanation must be a form of causal explanation because, if it were not, 
there would be no way to account for the distinction between having a 
reason to choose and choosing with it and having a reason to choose and 
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choosing because of it.30 One may justify a choice by citing a reason one 
has even if in choosing one did not choose because of it, but one cannot 
explain a choice by citing a reason unless one chooses because of it. 
To illustrate the objection, consider an executioner named Smith. 
Smith is ordered to put to death a certain individual, Charles. Charles 
was caught in the act of, confessed to, and was convicted for murdering 
a woman who happens to have been Smith's wife. Smith has two rea-
sons for putting Charles to death. On the one hand, he believes that it is 
his job and moral duty to put to death persons guilty of the heinous 
crime of murder. On the other hand, Smith desires to get revenge 
against Charles by killing him. Smith has more than one reason to kill 
Charles. Both reasons justify the act. After putting Charles to death, 
Smith tells a reporter that he chose to put Charles to death in order to 
carry out what he believed was his job and moral duty, and he did not 
choose to kill him in order to get revenge. According to the critic, this 
can only mean that Smith's having the one reason caused him to make 
the choice and his having the other reason did not. But this is not the 
only way to explain Charles' choice. The distinction drawn to our atten-
tion by the critic can be accounted for on a teleological explanation of 
Smith's choice. On the teleological view of explanation, Smith chose to 
put Charles to death in order to fulfill his job and moral duty. Even 
though he had more than one reason which justified his choice, only one 
explained it, namely, the one which gives the purpose for which he 
chose.31 
Given the plausible distinction in Smith's case between his putting 
Charles to death in order to carry out what he believed was his job and 
moral duty as opposed to putting Charles to death in order to get 
revenge, the noncausal agency theorist has a way to account for the dis-
tinction between having a reason and choosing with it and having a rea-
son and choosing because of it. How is this teleological understanding 
of explanation any less effective as a way of accounting for this distinc-
tion than saying that one reason caused the choice and the other did 
not? Three arguments which a nonlibertarian critic might make are as 
follows: 
First, a critic might argue that the causal theorist's account is superior 
because it is a more complete explanation. The causal theorist can say 
that causation involves laws and the reason which caused the choice did 
so because it and the choice are describable, at some level, in terms 
which make reference to laws. The noncausal theorist's account of the 
relationship between a reason and a choice is inferior because it cannot 
be further explicated in this way. 
At this point, the causal theorist has just begged the question against 
the noncausal theorist. The point ultimately at issue between them is 
whether there are, at any level of description, lawlike explanations of 
choices. The noncausal agency theorist maintains that there are not and 
it is not an argument against his position to say that causal explanation 
is a more ultimate or genuine form of explanation because it involves 
nomic concepts. The truth is that with the distinction between causal 
and teleological explanation one has reached two irreducible ways of 
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explaining events. There is no sound argument which will prove that 
the latter form of explanation is less basic than and a form of the former. 
Second, a critic might argue that it may be asked of Smith why he 
chose to put Charles to death in order to fulfill his moral duty and not in 
order to get revenge. Why did Smith choose to execute Charles for the 
one reason and not for the other? If there is no answer to this question, 
was not the choice fortuitous? If it was fortuitous, how can Smith be 
free and responsible? 
Interpreted in one way, the critic's question plausibly suggests the 
existence of something like the previously acknowledged principle P 
which made Smith's choosing to put Charles to death for the reason that 
he did rational, as opposed to irrational. Interpreted in a second way, 
however, the critic's question wrongly implies that there must have been 
an explanation for why Smith made the rational choice as opposed to 
the irrational one. On this second reading, the critic's question assumes 
the reality of what does not exist (compare the question: 'Why did you 
beat your wife?' asked of a man who has not beaten his wife). Moreover, 
it is precisely because there is no explanation of the kind which is sought 
for in the critic's question that Smith's choice is the locus of his freedom 
and responsibility.32 
Third, a critic might maintain that to say, in the situation as described, 
that Smith was free to choose and chose as he did for the one reason and 
not for the other is unsatisfying. One wants to know more about what 
makes the one reason and not the other the reason for which he chose to 
act, given that at the time of choosing he was aware of both reasons for 
acting. Must there not be, say, some kind of counterfactual among the 
truth conditions of his choice, a counterfactual such as 'If Smith had not 
believed that putting Charles to death was his job and moral duty, then 
he would not have chosen to put Charles to death.'? 
In the case of Smith, there is no reason to think that the truth condi-
tions of his choice include or entail a relevant counterfactual. Because 
Smith has more than one reason for putting Charles to death, he could 
have lacked the reason for putting Charles to death upon which he acted 
and still have chosen to put Charles to death. Thus, in a counterfactual 
situation where Smith is no longer an executioner but Charles has mur-
dered his wife, Smith could still have chosen to kill Charles in order to 
get revenge. 
That a reason is an adequate explanation of a choice need not imply 
that there exists a counterfactual dependence of the choice on that rea-
son such that if that reason had not existed, the choice would not have 
been made. '3 It does not imply this in a case of freedom such as that 
involving Smith and Charles. However, it is false to conclude from this 
example that explanation of a choice in terms of a reason will never 
imply the assertion of a counterfactual dependence of the suggested 
kind. For example, in a case where an agent has a reason to perform an 
action A, a reason not to perform A, but no other reason to perform A, if 
it had been the case that the agent lacked that reason for doing A and 
acquired no other reason to A, then he would not have chosen to A. This 
is because an agent can only choose to A in a situation where he has a 
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reason to A. But in this counterfactual situation, he lacks such a reason. 
Because teleological explantion involves an agent conceiving of his 
action as a means to an end or as an end in itself, if he were no longer to 
conceive of his action in either of these ways, he would no longer have a 
reason to perform it. 
In summary, genuine explanation of a choice in terms of a reason 
does not always imply a true counterfactual which states that had the 
agent not had that reason, then he would not have chosen as he did. 
Sometimes such a counterfactual will be implied and sometimes it will 
not. But even in cases where it is implied, there is no reason to think 
that the conncection which links the reason and the choice is causal in 
nature. A teleological relation between the reason and the choice is most 
plausible and adequately accounts for the dependence of the choice on 
the reason. There is no reason to insist that this dependence must be 
understood causally which does not in one way or another assume the 
truth of determinism. 
It is important to point out that some libertarians have mistakenly 
believed that teleological explanation alone cannot account for the dis-
tinction between having a reason and choosing with it and having a rea-
son and choosing because of it. For example, Timothy O'Conner has 
recently maintained that a noncausal libertarian theory cannot account 
for the distinction between having a reason to choose and choosing with 
it and having a reason to choose and choosing because of it. There must 
be something to link the reason to choose and the choice made for that 
reason. O'Conner believes that this link must be causal in nature and 
develops what he regards as an agent-causationist account of freedom in 
which an agent has the causal capacity to cause the coming to be of an 
intention to act. The coming to be of an intention is an event-part of a 
decision (choice) which is made for a reason. Most important for pre-
sent considerations is O'Conner's view that the causation by the agent of 
the coming to be of an intention has no cause and is "dependent upon 
the reason he has ... for acting [deciding] in that way. . .. For the 
agent's free exercise of his causal capacity provides a necessary link 
between reason and action, without which the reason could not in any 
significant way explain the action."34 
Does O'Conner's agent-causationist account of freedom avoid the 
problem which he claims undermines the noncausallibertarian's expla-
nation of freedom? No. If there is a problem with explaining how a rea-
son explains an uncaused choice, there is a problem with explaining 
how a reason can explain an agent's uncaused exercising of his power to 
cause the coming to be of an intention, where the exercising of this 
power depends upon the reason for the decision of which the coming to 
be of the intention is a part. Since there is no problem for the noncausal 
libertarian who asserts that a reason alone can explain an uncaused 
choice, agent-causation is superfluous to an adequate account of agency. 
My position on teleological explanation is that the explanatory con-
nection between a reason and the action performed for that reason is 
primitive and unanalyzable. Ginet is a libertarian who believes that this 
connection can be explicated in terms of an intention to act. On his 
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view, an action is explicable in terms of an intention had by the agent at 
the time of performing an action, where the intention refers directly to 
the action and its content specifies that the action is being done in order 
to fulfill the remembered reason for performing it. To illustrate his posi-
tion, Ginet takes an agent 5 who urgently needs her glasses which she 
has left in R's room where R is now sleeping. 
5 has some desire to wake R, because she would then have R's 
company, but also some desire not to wake R, because she 
knows that R needs the sleep. 5 decides to enter R's room in 
order to get her glasses, knowing as she does so that her action 
will satisfy her desire to wake R. Could it nevertheless be true 
that 5 did not intend of her action that it wake R? . .. It seems 
right to say that 5 did not intend to wake R if 5 was so disposed 
that, had it turned out that her entering the room did not wake 
R, 5 would not have felt that her plan had failed to be complete-
ly realized, and she must then either wake R in some other way 
or decide to abandon part of her plan. And 5' s being thus 
uncommitted to waking R is quite compatible with 5' s expecting 
and desiring to wake R.35 
Ginet's view as applied to the case of Smith and Charles implies that 
Smith executed Charles in order to fulfill his duty because he intended 
of the execution that it fulfill his duty but he did not execute him in 
order to get revenge because he did not intend of the execution that it be 
done in order to get revenge. 
Ginet has not succeeded in explicating the explanatory connection 
between a reason and the free action (choice) performed for that reason 
in terms of intention. This is because an intention (which is a commit-
ment to act) is formed on the basis of a choice made for a reason. Free 
agents such as 5 and Smith only intend to perform actions for reasons 
because they first choose for those reasons to perform those actions.36 
Thus, while the concept of intention provides an explanatory connection 
between the choice and the chosen action, it provides no such connec-
tion between the reason and the choice itself. 
At this point, Ginet might argue that it is false to maintain that free 
agents only intend to perform those actions which they first choose to 
do. Free agents such as 5 and Smith also intend their choices to act. 
They must intend those choices because their choices are teleologically 
explained by reasons R and an intention is required to forge a link 
between R and those choices. 
To understand the inadequacy of this response, one needs to consider 
how free agents are able to intend their choices on this view. What 
explains such intentions to choose? The reasons R for which the choices 
are made? But if R can explain these intentions directly, without the need 
for something to forge an explanatory connection between the two of 
them, why cannot R explain the choices directly, without the need for 
intermediate intentions to link the choices with their reasons? If R do not 
explain the intentions, perhaps further reasons R' explain them. But if free 
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agents intend their choices for reasons R', will they not need second-order 
intentions to link the first-order intentions with their reasons R'? Here, a 
vicious regress seems unavoidable. The only way to avoid such a regress 
is to say that free agents intend their choices for reasons R', and that is the 
end of the matter. But if there is no problem with saying this, there is no 
problem with saying that free agents such as 5 and Smith choose for rea-
sons R, and that is the end of the matter. Thus, in the end, there is nothing 
problematic with the libertarian position which maintains that choices are 
teleologically explained for reasons and teleological explanation cannot be 
explicated in terms of any other concept such as intention. 
In written correspondence, Ginet has responded to my criticism of his 
view by maintaining that he would prefer to talk in terms of the act of 
adopting the intention to A, instead of the act of choosing to A. In this way, 
the act of adopting the intention to A forges an explanatory connection 
between A and the reason R for which A is done. Even if we concede to 
Ginet his preference, it can still be shown that intention cannot plausibly be 
used to forge an explanatory connection between A and R. This is because 
adopting an intention is itself an act and, as such, is explained by a reason. 
What forges an explanatory connection between the adopting of an inten-
tion and the reason for which it is adopted? Is there some further intention 
which is adopted? If there is, then it will have to be adopted for a reason 
and an explanatory connection will have to be forged between it and that 
reason. A vicious regress like that described in the previous paragraph is 
avoidable only by saying that an intention can be adopted for a reason 
without any explanatory connection between it and that reason being 
forged by a further intention. But if this is the case, then the explanatory 
connection between a reason and the act of adopting an intention is ulti-
mately primitive and unanalyzable and intention cannot be used in the 
way Ginet suggests to clarify the nature of teleological explanation.3? 
III 
I conclude that the teleological explanation of an essentially uncaused 
choice is a coherent concept which is supported by the epistemology of 
choosing. Indeed, I maintain that the concept has the status of a concep-
tual truth. Theists would do well to take a libertarianism which asserts 
this more seriously. As Plantinga notes, one essential component of the-
ism is that God holds human agents responsible for what they do, and 
that libertarian freedom is necessary for such responsibility.38 By seeking 
to explain freedom in terms of agent-causation, the theist always, if ever 
so slightly, undermines the thesis that we are really free and responsible. 
This is because the inclusion of causation in any form raises the spectre of 
causal determinism and the view that nothing is adequately explained 
without it, which is precisely what the libertarian denies is true. If we 
really are free in the libertarian sense, a free action is uncaused. 3Y 
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